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Theodicy is a concept developed by Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz (1646–1716) to justify the existence and
absolute perfection of God despite the evil that exists
in the world. The term appeared in 1710 in the title of
Leibniz’s work Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God,
the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, and with it
he coined an optimistic variant par excellence on theories
of evil. Insofar as science and technology are often
interpreted as responses to evil, theodicy is related to
their modern emergence.
BACKGROUND AND EMERGENCE
Theories of evil have been developed by Plotinus (204–
270), Augustine (354–430), and others in which evil is
seen as necessary for universal harmony. Within the
framework of the complex theological discussions on the
origin of evil, Leibniz’s theodicy denies both the idea of
God as a malevolent creator of the world (a position taken
by certain Gnostics) and the refutation of this theory by
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Origen (c. 185–254) and Augustine who, in postulating
human freedom, attributed moral responsibility for all the
evils of the world to human beings, in the form of sin.
Leibniz’s particular approach was to interpret
perfection as the state of a thing when it attains its
highest level of being. This definition highlights God’s
perfection. From the quantitative point of view, God has
all perfections; from the qualitative point of view, these
perfections reach their highest form in him. God is
therefore omniscient and omnipotent. Despite the
impressions that evil, injustice, and suffering give us of
the world, God’s perfection is necessarily expressed in his
creation.
This theory is, paradoxically, a key philosophical
element of transition to modernity, a vital bridge to the
new philosophies that emerged in the second half of the
eighteenth century: the philosophy of history, philosophi-
cal anthropology, and aesthetic philosophy. The advance
of these philosophies is tied to a new understanding of
human nature that rejects the naturalism of seventeenth
century thought, as well as traditional Christian theology.
All the images of the human that developed in the
eighteenth century were optimistic in ways reflecting
theodicy—as can be illustrated in moral humanity
(Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury [1671–1713]),
rational humanity (Jean-Jacques Rousseau [1712–1778],
Immanuel Kant [1724–1804]), economic humanity
(Adam Smith [1723–1790]), and perfectible humanity
(Condorcet [1743–1794]).
Although the idea of a human fall did not
immediately disappear, a new concept began to replace
it—not exactly of human greatness, but of the ability of
humans to do what was necessary to make the world
better for the human species. To understand this
situation is to recognize the significance of Leibnizian
theodicy for modern science and technology, as well as
for ethics in the era of modernity. Leibniz’s theodicy was
both necessary for and representative of the modern
world, insofar as it gave expression to a vision of the
human condition as one which, aided by science and
technology, was no longer characterized by powerless-
ness, suffering, and evil. These were henceforth looked at
outside Leibniz’s own metaphysical framework as being
essentially surmountable.
COLLAPSE AND CONTINUITY
With the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, Leibniz’s justifica-
tion of God in the face of worldly evil collapsed, in a
complex historical context where science began progres-
sively to replace religion as the cultural frame of reference.
Nevertheless, the semantic core of Leibniz’s arguments—
that to compensate for evil is in fact the purpose the divine
creator had before him—held firm. As Odo Marquard
(1989, 38–63) argued, Leibniz provided the teleological
framework in which science and technology could become
both means and ends. In Leibniz’s theology, that basic
principle is “malum through bonum”: God does not make
up for evil with good, but evil is rehabilitated by the good
it pursues. Tolerance in the face of evil is justified by
having the highest good as the end in view, insofar as evil
is the condition that makes the good possible.
In this sense, the principle of theodicy is that the ends
justify the means. With the collapse of Leibnizian
theodicy in its original form, human beings take the
place left vacant by the omnipotent creative will, and
theodicy is transformed into anthropodicy or human
progress. Humanity as an end in itself is free to use
everything else as mere means, inheriting God’s role in
order to realize and complete theodicy in history. Every
goal achieved became a new means toward another end.
As a result of this teleological sequence of means and
ends, what came to predominate was not the possible uses
of the means, but the very means themselves. The ends no
longer justified the means, the means justified the ends.
This logic is linked to the cost/benefit compensation
criterion of utilitarianism: every good has its price. As
Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834) wrote in his Essay
on the Principle of Population (1798): “There is evil in the
world, not in order to produce despair, but rather
activity.” This idea is equally present in other modern
thinkers, such as Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733):
“There are ‘private vices’ [malum], but they are ‘public
benefits’ [bonum through malum].”
THE EXAMPLE OF COURNOT AND TEILHARD
Among those who developed philosophies of history
guided by an optimistic approach or who believed in
humanity’s ascending progress to an ideal state were the
Frenchmen Antoine-Augustin Cournot (1801–1877), a
teacher of mathematics and author of several works on the
philosophy of history, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin
(1881–1955), a Jesuit priest, paleontologist, and philoso-
pher of nature. Though sometimes neglected, these two
thinkers developed unusual and powerful syntheses that
reflect the subtle and penetrating influence wielded by the
Leibnizian idea of an omnipotent creative will. Their work
had significant repercussions during their own lifetimes,
and their theoretical constructs are still surprisingly topical
in the twenty-first century: Cournot as a prophet of
posthistorical technological civilization, Teilhard as the
prophet of transhumanism.
For the century in which he lived, Cournot was the
thinker who developed with the greatest persistence a
philosophy of history in which science and technology
take pride of place. His philosophy of history is based on a
series of binary opposites: chance and necessity, reason
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and instinct, passions and interests. With these concepts,
his reading of history was finalistic, and he argued for the
likelihood or even the inevitability of what has come to be
called “the end of history,” a partly Hegelian premise that
was revived at the end of the twentieth century in a world
that claimed the end of ideology, of utopia, of politics, of
the human. Hermínio Martins (1998), who has empha-
sized the importance of Cournot for the philosophy of
technology, argues that Cournot’s “end of history”
semantics do not imply a form of necessitarianism, in
the sense of extinction or termination, but more correctly
exhaustion, completion, fulfillment, or consummation.
Cournot’s temporal interpretation of collective
human existence is based on a system of three great
time-phases, as found in the work of Auguste Comte
(1798–1857) and Karl Marx (1818–1883), and closely
related to different kinds of discourse. The first phase has
been labeled ethnological and is characterized by the
subordination of reason to instinct, of the planful to the
unreflective. Habit and custom predominate, and are
accompanied by natural or human disasters. The second
stage is the phase of history itself. This is defined by an
increase in rationality in thought and action, and by a
combination of passions and interests as the springs of
action with sufficient power to give rise to colossal events,
of which the French Revolution is an example. The third
and terminal phase is the closest possible approximation to
the ideal, which humanity will never be able to attain. In
this phase, “political faiths” decline, as occurred during
the French Revolution, and give way to the peaceable play
of economic interest and the doux commerce.
This third stage establishes a posthistoric society that
conquers nature by systematic scientific discovery,
technological invention, innovation, and economic
growth. Cournot anticipates positions that were further
developed in the twentieth century, such as Joseph
Schumpeter’s (1883–1950) routinization of economic
innovation and what Alfred North Whitehead (1861–
1947) calls the “invention of invention.” But Cournot
does not show any significant concern with the possible
intrinsic limits of scientific progress, which might bar
further fundamental technological advance.
Teilhard’s approach to human history also embodies
finalism, and the role of scientific and technological
advance within it, although his vision embraces different
domains from those of Cournot. Teilhard’s arguments
have roots in the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859–
1941), and are part of the new theology of history that
seeks to protect theology from the temptation of
rationalist hermeneutics. Nonetheless, it did not shy away
from dealing with “earthly realities,” such as the
relationship between humans and nature, the carnal
nature of human beings, scientific humanism, and the
theology of science. Teilhard’s thinking embodied these
contributions, and added a lively intuition of the
evolutionist and voluntarist scientific and technological
type that aroused serious suspicions in Rome. Contraven-
ing some basic postulates of Christianity, he argued for the
“spiritual value of matter,” and developed a conception in
which humankind, with its artistic achievements, techno-
logical artifacts, and religions, is part of an overall
evolutionary scheme in which there exists a progressive
manifestation of biochemical complexity on the path to a
growing unified consciousness.
In the tradition of the omnipotent creative will,
Teilhard argued that perfection lies in the progress not of
individuals but of humanity as a whole on a path toward
unification with God who, being in essence supernatural, is
at the same time the natural outcome of evolution. In his
main work, The Phenomenon of Man (1959), he develops a
suggestive synthesis of science and religion, in the context
of a view of the universe as a system that develops from one
phase to another with ever-higher forms of consciousness.
Postulating history as progress, the flow of the moral
perfectibility of humanity as a whole, science and
technology provide the motor for intelligibility, enabling
new forms of awareness and clear-sightedness. Far from the
profane vision of science, Teilhard understands the
operative frameworks of science as participants in evolu-
tionary terms attaining their epilogue in Christifying
salvation. All of science thereby becomes a certain form
of liturgy. Simultaneously, the holistic and technological
dimensions to history encounter in the science and
technology of the last century the most grandiose drivers
of impulsion/ebullition, ensuring that even the unprece-
dented evils of the twentieth century might, in part, be
understood as lateral sideshows to ongoing changes.
Teilhard represents a landmark to Internet-era ideologues
advocating the role of globalization as a new stage fostering
the continuation of evolution in the Darwinian sense of the
term. While Homo sapiens constitutes the biological state of
evolution, this process might subsequently be taken on by
humanity as it gradually becomes aware of its own unity
through information technology networks.
Teilhard’s speculations anticipated those who favor a
transhuman future, which appears possible and desirable.
These transhumanists are convinced that the new
computational technologies are creating a collective
human intellect, a kind of cognitive and mental
hyperextension of the human mind. Cournot, by contrast,
thought that organic life would remain fundamentally
inaccessible to mathematical and experimental science,
while postulating that increasing knowledge of inanimate
nature would be sufficient to ensure technical perfectibili-
ty and material progress.
SEE ALSO Leibniz, G. W.; Progress.
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It is common, in classifying interventions, to sort them
into those that are therapeutic, that is, directed at
diminishing the harms suffered by a patient, and those
that are enhancing, that is, directed at increasing the
goods experienced by a patient. At least three indepen-
dent but related questions can be raised about the
therapy/enhancement distinction: (1) Can the two
terms therapy and enhancement be defined clearly,
reliably, and accurately? (2) Assuming they can be
satisfactorily defined, under what circumstances is it
morally justified for a physician to engage in either
activity? (3) Assuming they can be satisfactorily defined,
what implications does labeling an intervention as
therapeutic or enhancing have on the issue of whether
the cost of the intervention should be borne in part or in
whole by third-party funding agencies?
DEFINING THERAPY AND ENHANCEMENT
The distinction between therapy and enhancement can
be most clearly made by first having available a clear
definition of a third term: malady. The following
definition, adapted from Bioethics: A Return to Funda-
mentals (Gert, Culver, and Clouser 1997, 104),
classifies all clear cases of maladies as maladies and
does not classify as a malady any condition that is
clearly not a malady. An individual has a malady if and
only if he or she has a condition that is not normal for
a person in his or her prime, other than his or her
rational beliefs or desires, such that he or she is
suffering, or is at a significantly increased risk of
suffering, a nontrivial harm or evil (death, pain,
disability, loss of freedom, or loss of pleasure) in the
absence of a distinct sustaining cause.
Therapies are interventions whose intention is to
reduce or eliminate the harms that are a defining
characteristic of maladies. If an intervention is not
directed toward reducing or eliminating the harms
associated with a malady, then it is not a therapy.
Enhancements are interventions directed toward increas-
ing the personal goods experienced by another person,
such as abilities (including knowledge), freedom, and
pleasure. If an intervention is not directed toward
increasing another’s personal goods, then it is not an
enhancement. These definitions seem to correctly classify
all cases of therapies and enhancements.
An extensive project, the Enhancement Project,
sponsored by the Hastings Center concluded that the
terms therapy and enhancement could not be defined
clearly and could thus serve only as “conversation
starters.” In the words of the project coordinator, “Like
many distinctions, the treatment/enhancement distinc-
tion is permeable, unstable, and can be used for
pernicious purposes” (Parens 1998, 25). The concept
of enhancement is also often conflated with notions of
transhumanism, which presents even more definitional
difficulties. In contrast, the present article argues that
the two basic terms can be defined clearly, with the
advantage that clear definitions decrease the likelihood
of any pernicious applications of the terms.
There are inevitable borderline cases. For example,
how should one classify the administration of growth
hormone to a child destined to be very short but who
shows no evidence of an endocrinopathy? There is
disagreement about this question, but not because of
any avoidable vagueness in the definitions given here.
Instead, the disagreement is about whether this
condition is a malady. If it is not a malady, then
administering growth hormone is not a therapy; if it is
a malady, then administering growth hormone is a
therapy. Both Eric T. Juengst (1998) and Norman
Daniels (1994) also use the concept of malady in
distinguishing between therapies and enhancements,
although Daniels’s definition of malady differs from
the one given here.
Therapy and Enhancement
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